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ABSTRACT 
Large-scale social safety net programs such as India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA) are difficult to implement due to governance challenges related to elite capture, leakages, and 
corruption. The ability to identify how the governance challenges of program implementation can be met 
requires detailed insights into the actual process of program implementation, with clear views on the 
source of leakage and mismanagement, the sensitivity of program implementation to the influence of 
different actors, local power structures and informal bureaucratic processes.  
This paper uses a new participatory research method, referred to as Process-Influence Mapping, 
to shed light on these issues and related governance challenges, using the implementation of NREGA as 
an example. The Process-Influence Mapping tool helps identify the specific features of the NREGA 
implementation process that limit the program’s effectiveness (for example, elite capture in the definition 
of work and capacity limitations due to staff shortages and lack of training) and create scope for the 
misappropriation of funds. The insights gained can be used to identify policy options for reforming the 
administrative process of NREGA implementation so as to create an effective social safety net. 
Keywords:  National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, India, governance, participatory research 
method, Process-Influence-Map  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, India’s parliament passed the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), which is 
the central government’s response to the constitutionally manifested right to work and a means to 
promote livelihood security in India’s rural areas. To this end, the Act guarantees 100 days of annual 
employment at statutory minimum wage rates to any rural household whose adult members are willing to 
do unskilled manual work. The manual work needs to create sustainable assets that promote the economic 
and infrastructure development of villages.
1
There are two types of governance challenges that make the large-scale implementation of social 
safety nets in rural areas, such as those implemented under NREGA, inherently difficult: (1) the challenge 
of avoiding elite capture and of actually reaching the poor and the disadvantaged, and (2) the challenge of 
managing the funds allocated to the program effectively and avoiding leakages and corruption. As a 
public works program, NREGA uses a self-targeting mechanism to meet the first challenge. In fact, the 
program has been remarkably successful in this regard. More than half of its beneficiaries belong to 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and more than half are women.
 Implemented in three phases beginning in 2006, the Act 
extended to all of rural India in April 2008. NREGA is an innovative answer to the long-standing problem 
of providing social safety nets in rural areas. Most importantly, it is a rights-based approach. In the words 
of social activist Aruna Roy (2009, quoted in UNDP 2009), NREGA exemplifies the features of a 
“mature democracy”, which provides “the poor with the right to demand, the right to know and the right 
to dignity. Not the right to beg.” 
2
The second challenge is more difficult to meet because NREGA involves two features that have 
been highlighted in the literature as particularly challenging. First, the program is “transaction-intensive” 
in terms of time and space: It requires day-to-day action throughout a country that spans an entire 
subcontinent. Second, the program requires discretion, since decisionmaking on issues such as the type of 
infrastructure to be created under the program cannot easily be standardized. As Prittchett and Woolcock 
(2004) have shown, there are no simple administrative solutions to the problem of managing programs 
that are at same time transaction-intensive and discretionary.  
  
Informed by India’s far-ranging experience in managing rural welfare programs, NREGA has 
already gone a long way in including innovative design features aimed at overcoming the well-known 
implementation challenges of such programs. As further discussed below, NREGA is implemented in a 
decentralized manner and includes substantial checks and balances as well as oversight and complaint 
mechanisms. Yet, available evidence indicates that massive implementation problems remain (see Section 
3). At the same time, there are constant efforts to adjust the implementation procedures to resolve these 
challenges. This paper aims to support these efforts by analyzing the administrative implementation 
procedures of NREGA.  
The paper is based on the recognition that “the devil is in the details” when it comes to the 
implementation of programs such as NREGA. These details are often overlooked or treated as a “black 
box” in the literature on program implementation, yet understanding them is crucial to being able to 
determine how the governance challenges of program implementation can be met. In particular, it is 
essential to identify how the actual process of program implementation differs from what is foreseen in 
the implementation guidelines, and to identify where exactly the opportunities for leakage and 
mismanagement arise. Likewise, it is crucial to find out how much influence various actors have on the 
implementation process, and how local power structures and informal bureaucratic processes affect 
program implementation. 
This paper uses a new research method, referred to as Process-Influence Mapping, to shed light 
on these questions. Process-Influence Mapping is a participatory mapping technique that is based on the 
Net-Map tool (Schiffer and Waale 2008).
3
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 Process-Influence Mapping combines elements of various tools 
2 See figures on the official website of NREGA at http://nrega.nic.in/. 
3 For details see http://netmap.wordpress.com. 2 
that have been developed to analyze stakeholder interaction and political processes (World Bank 2007). 
The technique can be used in interviews with individuals or groups and involves three main steps: (1) 
mapping all stakeholders or actors involved in a particular process, (2) drawing a flowchart of the steps 
involved in the process, and (3) ranking the influence of various actors on the process by using checkers 
game or carom board pieces for visualization (see Figure 1 in Section 4.1.). The result is a three-
dimensional map that serves as a basis for further discussions with the interviewees. The map can then 
also be used to identify problems in the implementation process and to identify entry points for 
overcoming these problems.  
This paper presents the results from a case study in which Process-Influence Mapping was 
applied in two districts in Bihar to analyze the implementation of NREGA. The study was conducted 
jointly by researchers from the International Food Policy Research Institute, the Institute for Social and 
Economic Change, and the Tata Institute of Social Sciences. The study was carried out in the first district 
in April 2008 and in the second district in January 2009. The time difference made it possible to gain 
some insights into the implementation challenges of a change in the administrative structure of the 
NREGA project that involved the payment of wages through banks and post offices. The remainder of 
this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the guidelines for the administrative processes 
through which NREGA is supposed to be implemented, and Section 3 reviews the existing literature 
about NREGA implementation and its challenges. Section 4 describes the Process-Influence Mapping 
tool in more detail, explains the selection of the case study location, and reports the major insights 
regarding the governance challenges of NREGA implementation that have been derived from the Process-
Influence Mapping exercise. Section 5 uses the Process-Influence Maps to derive possible strategies for 
strengthening the effectiveness of the NREGA implementation process.  3 
2.  NREGA IMPLEMENTATION IN THEORY
4
The implementation of NREGA involves institutions at the central government and state level, and at all 
three tiers of local government in India, which includes the zilla panchayat at the district level, the taluk 
panchayat at the block level, and the gram panchayat at the village level. The most important agency at 
the central government is the Ministry of Rural Development and the ministry-founded Central 
Employment Guarantee Council (CEGC). The ministry is responsible for ensuring the adequate and 
timely delivery of resources to the states and for reviewing, monitoring, and evaluating the use of these 
resources, as well as NREGA processes and outcomes. The CEGC advises the central government on 
NREGA-related matters and monitors and evaluates the implementation of the Act. The council is 
mandated to prepare annual reports on the implementation of NREGA and submit these to the parliament.  
 
The pivotal institution at the state level is the state government, which is required to formulate a 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (REGS) that conforms to the minimum features specified under 
the Act. In addition, the state government must constitute the State Employment Guarantee Council 
(SEGC), whose main responsibility is to advise the state government on NREGA-related matters and to 
monitor and evaluate the implementation of the Act. Finally, the state government is responsible for 
ensuring the adequate and timely release of the state share of the REGS budget and facilitates 
administrative, financial, and technical support for all implementing bodies at the zilla (district), taluk 
(block), and gram (village) panchayat level.  
Since NREGA foresees a decentralized implementation, the principal authorities for the 
implementation of the REGS are the local government (panchayat) institutions at the district, block, and 
village level. In order to provide employment in a timely and adequate manner, the local government 
institutions at all levels must identify priority areas of employment-generating activities and propose, 
scrutinize, and approve the respective REGS projects. At the district level, the identification of the REGS 
projects is guided by the five-year District Perspective Plan, which specifies the long-term employment-
generation and development perspectives of the district. In addition to the long-term plan, local 
government institutions at all levels must also identify the priority activities to be taken up in a year. At 
the gram panchayat level, these priority areas are decided during village council (gram sabha) and 
subvillage council (ward sabha) meetings. Based on the recommendations formulated in the gram sabha 
and ward sabha, the gram panchayat prepares an annual plan and forwards it to the NREGA block 
program officer for technical sanction/approval. 
The program officer scrutinizes the annual plans of the individual gram panchayats for technical 
feasibility and submits a consolidated statement of approved proposals at the block level to the taluk (or 
intermediate) panchayat. The taluk panchayat discusses and approves the plan and forwards it to the 
district program coordinator. The coordinator scrutinizes the plan proposals of all taluk panchayats and 
consolidates them into a district plan proposal with a block-wise shelf of projects (arranged by gram 
panchayat). For each project, the district plan indicates (1) the time frame, (2) the person-days of labor to 
be generated, and (3) the full cost. This plan is discussed and approved by the zilla panchayat with the 
assistance of Technical Resource Support Groups. These groups are asked to assess the technical 
feasibility and cost efficiency of projects and to monitor and evaluate work implementation. Ultimately, 
the Technical Resource Support Groups help to define plans that can meet the demand for employment 
within 15 days of application. Following the approval of the development plans through the zilla 
panchayat, the gram panchayat must execute at least 50 percent of the projects as well as monitor and 
audit the implementation of the REGS at the gram panchayat level. The responsibility for these activities 
at the gram panchayat rests with the employment guarantee assistant, that is, the Gram Rozgar Sevak. 
Thirty percent of the development projects can be executed by the taluk panchayat and 20 percent can be 
realized through the zilla panchayat. Block- and district-level activities are expected to cover more than 
                                                       
4 This section builds on NREGA (2005); India, Ministry of Rural Development (2005); and Comptroller and Auditor 
General (2008). Appendix Table A.1 provides a summary of the actors and their functions as envisaged in the operational 
guidelines. 4 
one gram panchayat and taluk panchayat, respectively. Examples are roads that connect several gram or 
taluk panchayats. 
In addition to defining and implementing annual work plans that identify the priority activities to 
be taken up in a year, the gram panchayats are also responsible for verifying the households’ registration 
for NREGA employment, registering households for job cards, issuing and distributing job cards, 
allocating employment, initiating NREGA-related projects, measuring and evaluating the completed 
work, and remunerating the NREGA wage workers. The gram panchayats are required to issue job cards 
free of cost within 14 days after the application for registration is submitted (see India, Ministry of Rural 
Development 2008). Valid for a period of five years, job cards must carry the photographs of adult 
members. 
Following the issuing of job cards, rural households have a right to seek employment from the 
gram panchayat or the NREGA program officer after the state REGS is passed. Once the request for 
employment is submitted in writing to the gram panchayat or the program officer, stating the registration 
number of the job card, the date from which employment is required, and the number of days of 
employment required, work is to be provided within a radius of 5 kilometers of the village and within 15 
days of the date of demand. If the state fails to provide work within the mandated period for whatever 
reason, the applicant is entitled to an unemployment allowance at pre-fixed rates, paid by the state 
government. If work cannot be provided within a radius of 5 kilometers of the village, the rural workers 
are entitled to a markup equal to 10 percent of their wages.  
People who take up employment under NREGA are entitled to receive their wages between 7 and 
15 days after the date on which the work was executed for a period of at least 14 days. The wage rate 
must be at least as high as the minimum wage rate set by the central government or the state according to 
the Minimum Wages Act 1948 for agricultural laborers and must be paid according to a piece rate or daily 
rate and disbursed on a weekly or fortnightly basis. The minimum wage should not be less than 60 rupees 
(Rs.) per day and must be the same for men and women (see India, Ministry of Rural Development 2008). 
Besides setting minimum wages, NREGA also promotes livelihood security in rural areas by mandating a 
wage-to-material ratio of 60:40. To this end, the Act bans the use of machinery as well as contractors. The 
latter are perceived to exploit unskilled workers and to use capital- rather than labor-intensive production 
techniques.  
In terms of funding, NREGA activities are financed with funds from the central as well as state 
government. The central government releases funds directly to the districts through the National 
Employment Guarantee Fund. The funds cover 75 percent of the NREGA-related material and wage 
expenses of semiskilled and skilled workers. The central government is required to fund 100 percent of 
the wage costs of unskilled workers. The state government is mandated to provide the funds for the 
remaining 25 percent of expenses as well as the funds for the unemployment allowance payments and the 
administrative expenses of the SEGC. To this end, the state government releases revolving funds under 
the REGS to the implementing agencies at the district, block, and village levels. At all levels, the 
implementation of the REGS is facilitated by line departments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
central and state government undertakings, and self-help groups. 
 5 
3.  NREGA IMPLEMENTATION IN REALITY: INSIGHTS FROM THE LITERATURE 
As NREGA was introduced in phases beginning in 2006, assessments regarding the procedural challenges 
of NREGA implementation predominantly prevail for the Phase 1 districts (2006/07). The present review 
mainly emphasizes the performance assessment results of the 2008 Comptroller and Auditor General 
social audit (hereafter: CAG) and the 2007 Poorest Area Civil Society (PACS) Program – Civil Society 
Organization (CSO) survey (hereafter: PACS-CSO).
5 The CAG audit evaluated the implementation of 
NREGA in 558 gram panchayats and 141 blocks in 68 of the 200 districts that had been covered during 
the first phase of the NREGA program (meaning February 2006 to March 2007). The 68 districts belong 
to 26 states. In comparison, the PACS-CSO survey emphasized the experience of six states that had been 
subject to interventions under both NREGA and the U.K. Department for International Development 
(DFID) PACS Program. Accounting for differences in the socioeconomic and geographic conditions, 
primary data were collected for 283 gram panchayats and 600 villages from different sociocultural 
backgrounds in 39 districts of the six PACS-intervened states.
6
3.1. Technical and Administrative Implementation 
 In Bihar, the survey covered 8 districts, 50 
gram panchayats, and 172 villages. The findings refer to the fiscal year 2006/07. 
Under NREGA, the maintenance and computerization of records is an important means of promoting 
accountability and transparency in the generation of guaranteed employment. Accountability and 
transparency are promoted through computerization because records help to (1) authenticate the number 
of households that demanded and received employment, (2) substantiate the caste and gender distribution 
of NREGA employment, (3) identify the number of days of employment provided, and (4) locate any 
discrepancies between the number of work days demanded and provided.
7
For instance, the Employment Register in many gram panchayats was not maintained or missed 
details on the type and duration of employment demanded, the employment allotted, and the employment 
that was actually taken up. Muster Rolls and Muster Roll Issue and Receipt Registers did not carry the 
required unique identification numbers and did not furnish information on (1) the name of the person 
working, (2) the respective job card number, (3) the work order number, (4) the number of days worked, 
and (5) the wages paid. Due to these deficiencies, wages had been paid to unregistered and fictitious 
workers and to workers whose names had been recorded two or three times for the same time period, 
resulting in overpayment. In addition, the gram panchayats did not keep photocopies of the Muster Rolls 
for public inspection and the block program officer typically did not digitize the Muster Rolls (CAG 
2008, 51 and Section 8.8.1).  
 In reality, the CAG audit report 
identifies pronounced deficiencies in the preparation and/or maintenance of all types of records at all 
levels of local government. Major deficiencies concern the improper and untimely maintenance of the 
Employment Register, the Application Registration Register, the Job Card Register, the Asset Register, 
the Muster Rolls, the Muster Roll Issue and Receipt Register, and the Complaint Register.  
One important reason for the lack of adequate registers is the absence of a sufficiently large 
number of trained support staff, especially at the level of the block and the village. At the village level, 
manpower constraints predominantly concern the absence of the employment guarantee assistant 
(meaning the Gram Rozgar Sevak). Because the employment guarantee assistant is instrumental in the 
maintenance of NREGA-related records at the village level, the absence of this agent limits access to 
basic information such as employment demand and employment allocation. This, in turn, causes 
employment generation under NREGA to be a nontransparent and unaccountable process, which offers 
                                                       
5 This paper does not review the socioeconomic and infrastructural impact of REGS. See Siddhartha and Vanaik (2008) and 
PACS-CSO (2007) for respective (tentative) evidence. 
6 The states are Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Chattisgarh, Bihar, and Maharashtra. 
7 The most important records are the Application Registration Register, the Job Card Register, the Employment Register, the 
Asset Register, the Muster Rolls and Muster Roll Issue and Receipt Register, and the Complaint Register. The majority of these 
registers are to be maintained by the local governments. 6 
substantial scope for fraud and the misappropriation of funds. Unfortunately, the CAG and PACS-CSO 
reports do not assess or discuss the relative importance of the underlying incentive problems. 
Furthermore, potential beneficiaries of the REGS do not have a contact person at the local level who can 
easily be approached for employment, let alone for local proximity.  
At the block level, the CAG audit criticizes the absence of a (full-time) block program officer. In 
many instances, regional employment guarantee schemes are processed, approved, evaluated, and 
monitored by the block development officer. Because the block development officer is responsible for a 
large number of development programs, he or she cannot pay adequate attention to the needs of the 
NREGA-related employment guarantee schemes. In addition, the block level suffers from chronic 
shortages of technical support staff and is thus short of people who can assist in the planning, design, and 
estimation of NREGA projects and screen project proposals for their technical feasibility and cost 
efficiency. In fact, most blocks implemented NREGA projects through the same administrative and 
technical channels as other development programs. With the same number of people implementing a 
larger number of programs, the block development officer and the block-level staff lack the support 
infrastructure needed for the adequate implementation of the provisions of NREGA. This effect is further 
compounded by the absence of rules that specify the time for processing and approving proposals at 
different levels. 
As regards the capacity of the administrative and technical staff, the PACS-CSO report 
emphasizes the need for capacity-strengthening activities, especially at the level of the elected local 
governments. Capacity strengthening should be aimed at improving the ability of elected representatives 
to keep and maintain accounts, books, and Muster Rolls; to measure the volume and quality of work; and 
to conduct social audits (PACS-CSO 2007, 46). The current level of capacity-strengthening support is 
considered to leave elected local officials unable to deal with complex administrative and technical tasks. 
Outsourcing technical and administrative tasks to private resource persons in response to manpower 
constraints is unlikely to promote the effective implementation of NREGA activities unless these 
individuals are qualified and accountable to the elected local governments (see also Shah 2008).  
3.2. Plan Preparation and Work Execution 
The CAG audit report notes that annual plans were not at all or inadequately prepared or checked at the 
district and village level. At the district level, the district program coordinator often did not consolidate 
the plan proposals of the taluk panchayats into a district plan proposal with a block-wise shelf of projects. 
If a district plan existed, it frequently did not specify the time frame within which the projects should be 
carried out, did not indicate the person-days to be generated for each project, or did not specify the full 
cost for each project. Furthermore, the district plans frequently promoted projects that were not evaluated 
in terms of their technical feasibility. Counter to the implementation guidelines for the Act, the district 
plans also did not ensure that 50 percent of the projects were executed by the gram panchayats (CAG 
2008, 17–18).  
At the village level, the CAG and PACS-CSO reports note that gram panchayats frequently did 
not identify the low-wage areas of employment and the priority areas of gram panchayat work according 
to the principles of transparency and accountability. At the core of the problem are (1) elected gram 
panchayat representatives who are unaware of the steps that need to be taken in defining and executing 
the annual plans, (2) unannounced and unpublicized gram sabha meetings, and (3) low gram sabha 
participation rates. According to the CAG report, the low gram sabha participation rates reflect the lack of 
awareness among the rural poor regarding the provisions of NREGA. The lack of awareness is 
pronounced because the gram panchayats do not (1) organize gram sabha meetings that explain the 
provisions of the Act, (2) invite applications for registration, or (3) verify applications so as to ensure that 
all those who are entitled to work under NREGA can demand and ultimately receive employment. In 
view of these constraints, the annual plans were frequently prepared by external agencies or by the block- 
or district-level officials without the participation and consultation of rural households and/or the gram 
sabhas.  7 
Another problem in the implementation of projects relates to the requirement that all planned 
activities be technically and administratively sanctioned. According to the PACS-CSO survey, 50 percent 
of the sampled gram panchayats from six states received technical approval of the NREGA work within 7 
to 15 days and administrative approval and the respective funds for project implementation within another 
7 to 15 days. That is, NREGA-related work could start after a total of 15 to 30 days in 2006/07. In Bihar, 
only 40 percent of the sampled gram panchayats received technical approval within 7 to 15 days, while 29 
percent of the gram panchayats had to wait 31 to 60 days and 13 percent had to wait more than 60 days. 
For the same sample, 45 percent received funds within 7 to 15 days after the technical sanction, while 23 
percent and 21 percent were funded after, respectively, 31 to 60 days and more than 60 days.  
The PACS-CSO report documents that the speed at which projects are technically sanctioned 
depends on the payment of commissions to the block-level functionaries. Gram panchayats that paid 
commissions had projects approved in a shorter period of time. Similarly, gram panchayats with a 
sufficient number of well-trained personnel received the technical and administrative approvals faster. 
Still, the delay in the release of funds suggests that thorough planning on the part of gram panchayats is 
required to ensure timely access to employment under NREGA whenever the need for employment arises. 
In addition to thorough planning, another determinant of the successful generation of employment under 
NREGA is the willingness of the gram panchayat secretaries and executive officers to pursue and support 
NREGA-related activities. Ambasta, Shankar, and Shah (2008, 44) argue that if these agents lack 
commitment, they may take active measures to discourage even committed local government leaders from 
implementing the Act. One reason is the fear of being held (financially) responsible for any violations of 
NREGA provisions and guidelines and for any delays in the implementation of NREGA.  
3.3. Resource Utilization 
Under NREGA, three-fourths of the funds are to be provided by the central government and one-fourth by 
the states, as indicated above. In order to measure the success of the states in implementing the Act, the 
PACS-CSO study determines the degree of resource utilization. The assumption is that states that utilize 
more resources implement a larger number of low-wage projects, generate more employment and labor 
income, and create more infrastructure.  
Using the official NREGA data from the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, the PACS-CSO report 
shows that the average state in India utilized 73 percent of the NREGA-related funds in 2006/07. Bihar 
used only 60 percent. Funds thus do not appear to be a binding constraint under NREGA. The 
underutilization of funds could reflect the noncompliance with explicit funding guidelines at the level of 
the state, district, block, and village. For instance, the state is required to release funds within 15 days of 
the release of the central funds. In order to transfer and use the funds and to ensure transparency and 
accountability, the state government is required to design a complete Financial Management System. 
Under this system, separate bank accounts for NREGA-related funds must be opened at the level of the 
district, block, and village. At the same time, accounts need to be squared on a monthly basis in order to 
track the use of the funds and ensure financial accountability. The CAG report documents examples of 
states, districts, blocks, and villages that did not follow these and other guidelines. For example, the 
Government of Bihar experienced a cut in central funds in 2006/07 because it did not inform the 
Government of India about the funds that had been spent by the District Rural Development Agency 
(DRDA) of two districts (CAG 2008, Section 8.9.2.212.2.1).  
Turning to the wage-to-material ratio, Indian states generally complied with the requirement of 
the Act and maintained a wage-to-material ratio in excess of 60:40.
8
                                                       
8 The discussion of the wage share emphasizes the amount of funds spent on the wages of unskilled workers. The amount of 
funds spent on the wages of semiskilled or skilled workers is typically less than 6 percent (PACS-CSO 2007, Table 3.1).  
 In fact, on average, states spent 66.20 
percent of all funds on wages during the fiscal year 2006/07 (PACS-CSO 2007, Table 2.4). Although 
resource utilization was quite low, the wage-to-material ratio suggests that the pursued projects were 
labor-intensive. Bihar is one of the states with a comparatively low wage-to-material ratio (58.73 8 
percent). The CAG report attributes the low wage-to-material ratio to the material-intensive construction 
of brick soling roads and to the failure of the gram panchayat to identify low-wage projects (CAG 2008, 
18). The PACS-CSO survey (2007, 13) emphasizes that care must be exercised when interpreting these 
data, as block, district, and village functionaries lack the capacity to fill up formats or to upload data on 
the indicator variables of NREGA performance. Given this, states such as Bihar may actually comply 
with the required ratio of 60:40 but are said to spend too little on wages because records are not well 
maintained and stored.  
3.4. NREGA Wage Payments 
Although funds are not fully utilized, the prevailing wage-to-material ratio suggests that NREGA is an 
important instrument for providing income through employment-generating activities at least at the state 
level. In order to gain a better understanding of the extent to which NREGA supports livelihood, this 
section summarizes the existing evidence on NREGA in terms of the number of job cards provided, the 
number of work days received per household, and the wage rate earned. 
Ownership of a job card is the first step necessary to demand employment, claim wages, or claim 
unemployment allowance if a job is not provided within the time frame of 15 days. Using the official 
NREGA data, the PACS-CSO document shows that 37.85 million people were issued job cards in 
2006/07 all over India, which is equivalent to 70 percent of rural households. Bihar has issued fewer cards 
than warranted by the 2001 Census number of rural households, which could reflect people’s lack of 
awareness regarding the existence of a guaranteed employment scheme and the lack of publicly organized 
NREGA awareness-creation campaigns. In comparison to the results from the official NREGA data, the 
PACS-CSO survey suggests that 90 percent of the households in the aggregate sample of the selected six 
states that registered for job cards had been issued cards. This value is influenced by the experience of 
Bihar, where only 74.3 percent of the households that registered for job cards had been issued cards. The 
primary data of the PACS-CSO survey also suggest that in the aggregate of the sampled states, only 42.9 
percent of job cards were distributed to households. This low number is again driven by Bihar, where 
only 21.3 percent of job cards were distributed. 
The evidence from the PACS-CSO report (2007, 15–16) points to a substantial delay in the 
issuance and distribution of job cards, with households waiting up to 8 months to receive their cards. In 
addition, distributed job cards were eventually taken back and kept with the employment guarantee 
assistant or with the gram panchayat president and gram panchayat secretaries. The latter were found to 
make wrong job card entries, such as over-reporting the number of work days of NREGA employment 
provided. According to the PACS-CSO report, gram panchayat officials inflate the actual number of work 
days in order to accommodate commissions for the block-level functionaries such as the junior engineers 
and the block program officers.  
Households with job cards are entitled to receive employment within 15 days of employment 
registration. If the state fails to provide employment for whatever reason, the applicant is entitled to an 
unemployment allowance at pre-fixed rates, paid by the state government. Unemployment payments are 
typically not paid for a number of reasons. Job card holders demanding work typically do not obtain a 
receipt for the application and thus cannot prove the day of registration. As unemployment benefits must 
be paid entirely by the state government, the government is reluctant to pay unemployment allowance and 
may therefore refuse to accept applications for work or actively discourage job card holders from 
demanding work. Workers who have received NREGA employment report a response time to call for 
employment of 15 to 30 days. That is, the time between submitting the application for work and obtaining 
work is less than one month in most states.  
NREGA provides clear instructions on the manner and the time frame in which workers can 
receive their entitlements. One requirement mandates that at least 25 percent of wage payments involve 
cash, while 75 percent can involve both cash and in-kind payments. The PACS-CSO survey documents 
that most workers in Bihar and in India receive cash payments (see Table 1). NREGA also mandates that 
workers receive their wages at fixed rates between 7 and 15 days after the completion of the work. 9 
According to the PACS-CSO survey (Section 3.5.5), the majority of workers received their wages within 
30 days for the aggregate sample of Indian states and within 7 days for the sample of Bihar (Table 1). 
Delays in the payment of wages arise because wage payments are determined by the amount of work 
completed in a day rather than by the number of days worked. Numerous problems arise with 
measurement-based wage payments. First, assessments regarding the actual amount of work performed 
are unclear and are delayed mainly because of an insufficient number of technical support staff (such as 
civil engineers) that can measure work output. Second, measurements regarding the amount of work 
completed are likely to be imprecise, with the worker often receiving less than what he or she is entitled 
to. Third, the absence of properly maintained records (especially Muster Rolls and job cards) implies that 
neither the worker nor any Vigilance and Monitoring Committee can conclude whether full wages have 
been paid or not.
9
Table 1. Wage payment characteristics 
  
           
  Mode of Wage Payment  Timing of Wage Payment after Work Completion 
           
           
  Cash  Cash and kind  Less than 7 days  7 to 30 days  More than 30 days 
           
           
Bihar  84%  16%  58%  35%  7% 
Grand Total  92%  8%  33%  55%  13% 
           
Source:   PACS-CSO (2007, Section 3.5.4–3.5.6). The values are derived from graphical illustrations and are therefore 
approximations. Values may not sum to 1 due to rounding. 
One major provision of NREGA is employment generation without gender discrimination. 
However, both the PACS-CSO report and Drèze and Oldiges (2007) point to the existence of gender 
discrimination in work creation. The gender bias is particularly strong in the northern states of India, 
especially in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal, and Himachal Pradesh, where less 
than one-fourth of all work days are given to women. At the all-India level, women make up 40 percent of 
NREGA employment. Case study evidence compiled by PACS-CSO suggests that the low share of 
female workers, especially in the northern states, does not reflect a lack of demand but the hesitancy of 
elected local governments to provide work opportunities to women and the unwillingness of men to send 
their wives and daughters to workplaces in the public domain (PACS-CSO 2007, 30). At the core of 
gender discrimination are traditional and cultural factors and beliefs, which typically also result in wage 
discrimination against women. Wage discrimination arises from the vested belief that women are 
incapable of doing hard manual labor, which in turn causes elected local governments to pay lower wages 
to women than to men. In a study of Tamil Nadu, Narayanan (2008) suggests that women who bring their 
children to NREGA work sites in the absence of childcare facilities receive lower wages or are even 
turned away from work sites. The absence or insufficiency of childcare facilities at NREGA work sites 
thus adversely affects female participation rates in NREGA implementation (see also Drèze and Oldiges 
2007).  
 
                                                       
9 See the PACS-CSO report for more details on the approach used in determining the wage rate and the level of wages. As 
the present paper is interested in the administrative process of providing wage employment, the wage rates are not further 
considered. Siddhartha and Vanaik (2008) and Drèze and Oldiges (2007) summarize the number of work days that NREGA 
generates per household. 10 
3.5. Auditing, Monitoring, and Grievance Redress 
In order to ensure the effective implementation of NREGA, the Act includes provisions for social 
auditing, monitoring, and grievance redress. Social audits are required to verify 11 stages in the 
implementation of NREGA, including the job card registration of households and the biannual mandatory 
social audit in the gram sabha (see the CAG report). Monitoring requires block-, district-, and state-level 
officials to inspect 100 percent, 10 percent, and 2 percent of projects every year, respectively. At the gram 
panchayat level, Vigilance and Monitoring Committees are to monitor the progress and quality of work 
execution. In addition, the district authorities must prepare financial audits. Finally, grievance redress 
mechanisms and procedures at the block and district level must be devised by the state government. The 
mechanisms must deal with any NREGA-related complaint by any person and need to specify the 
procedures that will be used to handle complaints.  
The CAG report shows that the provisions for public auditing, monitoring, and grievance redress 
were not properly met under NREGA, at least during 2006/07. Although social audits are mandated to 
take place twice a year for all projects taken up within the gram panchayat in the preceding year, the CAG 
report notes that the majority of sampled gram panchayats did not implement any social audits. Ambasta, 
Shankar, and Shah (2008) report narrative evidence indicating that social audits were not implemented 
due to the poor maintenance of records and the insufficient mobilization of rural households to participate 
in gram sabha meetings. 
Regarding monitoring, there is strong evidence that state-, district-, and block-level officials do 
not inspect the required number of projects. At the gram panchayat level, monitoring is complicated by 
the nonexistence of Vigilance and Monitoring Committees (see CAG). Ambasta, Shankar, and Shah 
(2008) note, however, that even where Vigilance and Monitoring Committees exist, this might only be on 
paper. There are cases in which gram panchayat secretaries selected proxy Vigilance and Monitoring 
Committee members without informing the respective persons about their membership or their duties and 
powers. Furthermore, the mandatory social audits were not properly conducted by the gram sabha even in 
the presence of Vigilance and Monitoring Committees, given the rural communities’ lack of awareness 
regarding the audit objectives.  
At all levels, monitoring was complicated by the absence of up-to-date information on key 
parameters of NREGA performance, such as the number of registered workers, the registered demand for 
work, cost estimates, Muster Rolls, administrative decisions on the release and sanction of funds, the 
spending activities of the implementing agencies, and projects started and executed (see the CAG report). 
The inadequate flow of information reflects the absence of a well-functioning and integrated Management 
Information System (MIS) that contains timely and adequate data on the performance of NREGA at all 
stages of implementation. According to Ambasta, Shankar, and Shah (2008), the present MIS does not 
function effectively and comprehensively due to insufficient Internet connectivity and the lack of 
personnel sufficiently trained in data entry and posting. Instead, the implementation of NREGA presently 
relies on a nontransparent system of incomplete and time-consuming paper records. These factors 
combine to preclude concurrent vigilance, public audit, and transparency of NREGA-related activities. As 
a consequence, the REGS are implemented in an environment conducive to malfeasance, including 
corruption and the misappropriation of funds.  
In order to create an effective, accountable, transparent, and timely MIS that integrates all 
NREGA-related functions, functionaries, and funds and facilitates the timely transfer of data between all 
NREGA agents, Ambasta, Shankar, and Shah (2008) emphasize the need for investments in Internet 
connectivity, especially in remote areas. At the same time, capacity training in data entry and posting is 
needed to promote the effective use of the MIS as well as improve the quality of the available 
information. 11 
4.  CASE STUDY 
4.1. Case Selection and Research Methods 
In order to gain deeper insights into the administrative procedures of NREGA implementation, a case 
study was conducted in two districts
10 in Bihar, as explained in the introduction.
11 The two districts were 
selected by using 2001 Census information and the insights from a poverty and social assessment study of 
districts in Bihar as prepared by the Asian Development Research Institute.
12
In each district, two blocks were purposely selected, one again being better developed than the 
other. The selection was guided by the 2001 Census infrastructure data on the number of villages with 
drinking water, schooling, healthcare, post office, and public transportation facilities, among other factors. 
In addition, the selection was supported by insights from district officials. The better-off blocks in 
Districts A and B are referred to as Block A-A and B-A, respectively, while the less-well-performing 
blocks are referred to as Block A-B and Block B-B. In District A, ten villages were randomly selected in 
each selected block. With the assistance of block-level officials one well- and one less-well developed 
village from the list of ten villages was identified. In the selected case study sites, interviews were 
conducted with government officials at the district and block level and with NREGA beneficiaries in 
focus groups at the village level. As indicated in the introduction, the Process-Influence Mapping tool was 
applied to gain an in-depth understanding of how the implementation of NREGA works in practice, which 
and how actors are involved, and how much influence they have, in the perception of the respondents, on 
the ultimate outcome.  
 The latter clustered districts 
according to poverty, social vulnerability, livelihood potential, and social capital criteria. Qualifying the 
data along a 1–5 scale, one district that performed better (referred to as District A) and one that performed 
worse (referred to as District B) than the average district in Bihar were purposely selected.  
The remainder of this section describes the application of the Process-Influence Mapping tool 
taking the interviews of focus groups as an example. Dependent on the interview, the focus groups 
included (1) both villagers and representatives of gram panchayats such as the gram panchayat secretary 
or the employment guarantee assistant or (2) only the employment guarantee assistant or the NREGA 
program officer at the block level. Regardless of the focus group composition, the interviewees were 
asked in three stages about the steps that are taken to provide NREGA employment and wage payments to 
the unskilled poor in rural areas. In step one, the interviewee identified the actors that are involved in 
providing NREGA employment and wage payments, which in turn are marked on a sheet of paper (Figure 
1, panel A). The second stage represents the various actors with small figures, and arrows are used to 
describe the actions that are needed in order to provide NREGA employment and NREGA wages (Figure 
1, panel B). In a third step, “towers” of carom game pieces are built in order to visualize how much 
influence various actors have on providing NREGA employment and NREGA wage payments (Figure 1, 
panel C). At that stage, it was emphasized that the level of influence was not about “authority” but about 
the importance of actors in the implementation of NREGA as described in the Process-Influence Mapping 
exercise. 
   
                                                       
10 To ensure the anonymity of the respondents, the names of the selected districts, blocks, gram panchayats, villages, and 
interviewees are not disclosed. 
11 The study of NREGA was part of a more comprehensive case study that dealt with decentralized rural service provision. 
This study was sponsored by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World Bank through a Trust Fund 
Grant of the Bank-Netherlands Partnership Program (BNPP). 
12 We thank Vera Vemuru, senior social development specialist at the World Bank, for pointing out this study. 12 
Figure 1. Process-Influence Mapping 
Panel A  Panel B 
   




4.2. Case Study Findings 
The remainder of this section presents and discusses the results of applying the Process-Influence 
Mapping tool to the interviews with NREGA service providers (block program officer and employment 
guarantee assistant) and one village focus group. The interviewees identified the actors that are involved 
and the steps that are actually taken to provide NREGA wage employment and wage payments to the 
rural poor and unskilled. 
In order to facilitate the comparison of results across the various interviews, this section first 
summarizes the administrative procedure as envisaged in the operational guidelines of NREGA. The 
following sections reports the evidence from Process-Influence Mapping interviews with (1) one village 
focus group that implemented NREGA work at the block level in Block A-A,
13
                                                       
13 As indicated in Section 2, NREGA work can be carried out at the zilla, taluk, and gram panchayat level, with each level 
receiving a certain percentage of funds (20, 30, and 50 percent, respectively) for NREGA implementation. 
 (2) one NREGA program 
officer in Block B-A, and (3) one employment guarantee assistant in Block B-A so as to identify the 
governance challenges in program implementation. We supplement the Process-Influence Mapping 
results with insights from interviews in which the Process-Influence Mapping exercise could not be 
adequately applied. The respective evidence refers to interviews with one block development officer in 
Block A-B, one zilla parishad (the term used in Bihar for the elected district government) president in 
District A, and with NREGA beneficiaries in Block B-A.  13 
4.2.1 How NREGA Is Supposed to Be Implemented 
Figure 2 summarizes the implementation of NREGA as described in Section 2 and in the NREGA 
operational guidelines by means of the Process-Influence Mapping procedure. Panel A illustrates the main 
process, including the planning phase, and panel B presents the envisaged flow of funds and provides 
insights into who controls whom in the implementation of the projects executed by the gram, taluk, or 
zilla panchayat. Figure 2 indicates that the implementation process mainly involves the NRGEA workers 
and the block program officer. The gram panchayat and the gram sabha are, however, important in the 
identification of the projects that should be carried out under NREGA.  
NREGA workers are supposed to be proactive in applying for registration and employment as 
part of the demand- and rights-based employment program. Figure 2 also suggests that the law seeks to 
provide a complex web of check-and-balance mechanisms that cover the flow of funds and administrative 
procedures, and to create transparency and accountability, mainly through the creation of top-down state- 
and district-level control or accountability mechanisms and the social audits of NREGA-related projects 
by villagers during gram sabha meetings and through the gram sabha social audit forum. In addition, 
citizen information boards at work sites; Vigilance and Monitoring Committees; and block, district, and 
state- and district-level inspections are meant to foster transparency in the implementation of NREGA 
schemes. 
Figure 2. NREGA implementation according to operational guidelines 
Panel A: Processes  
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Figure 2. Continued 
Panel A: Processes 
Implementation process 
1.  Adult household members apply for registration. 
2.  Gram sabha verifies and mobilizes applications for registration and elects the members of the Vigilance and Monitoring Committee. 
3.  A household survey is performed for the identification of households that are willing to register for employment cards. 
4.  The gram panchayat sends a copy of the registration to the block program officer. 
5.  The block program officer reports to the taluk and zilla parishad. 
6.  The gram panchayat issues employment cards to registered households. 
7.  Adult household members apply for work at the gram panchayat or present themselves to the employment guarantee assistant (EGA). The 
EGA records the application in the employment register. The employment application via the block program officer is a “fallback” option 
only. 
8.  The gram panchayat informs (1) the block program officer about new work applications and (2) the Vigilance and Monitoring Committee 
about estimates regarding the work, time frame, and quality parameters. 
9.  The gram panchayat and block program officer assign employment. 
10.  The gram panchayat informs the block program officer about the employment allotments made. 
11.  The gram panchayat informs the block program officer about the start of work, and the block program officer issues registered Muster Rolls. 
12.  Upon completion of the work, the Vigilance and Monitoring Committee prepares the report and submits it to the gram sabha, the block 
program officer, and the district program coordinator. 
 
Planning process 
A.  The gram panchayat forwards the development plan and priorities to the block program officer. 
B.  The block program officer scrutinizes and approves the gram panchayat–specific proposals and sends the consolidated gram panchayat 
proposals to the taluk panchayat. 
C.  The taluk panchayat sends the approval of the shelf of gram panchayat proposals. 
D.  The block program officer forwards the shelf of gram panchayat proposals to the district program coordinator. 
E.  The district program coordinator consolidates the block plans and prepares the labor budget. The junior engineer assists the block program 
officer and develops and approves technical estimates. These are sent to the zilla parishad, which approves the block-wise shelf of projects 
and the labor budget. 
F.  The zilla parishad informs the district program coordinator about the approval. 
G.  The district program coordinator reports the approved projects to the block program officer.  
H.  The block program officer forwards a copy of the block plan to the gram panchayats. 
I.  The district program coordinator forwards the labor budget to the Government of Bihar. 
J.  The Government of Bihar forwards the labor budget to the Ministry of Rural Development. 
 
Panel B: Flow of funds and control (Who controls whom?) 
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Figure 2. Continued 
Who controls whom? 
1.  The Vigilance and Monitoring Committee monitors the implementation of the NREGA-related activities. 
2.  The gram panchayat monitors the work and related documents.  
3.  The district program coordinator and zilla parishad monitor the timely issue of job cards, the provision of employment, the implementation of 
social audits, the ﬂow of funds, and the progress and quality of work.  
4.  The taluk panchayats and the block program officer monitor the registration of households, the issue of job cards, the employment demanded 
and provided, the maintenance of Muster Rolls, the unemployment allowances paid, the social audits, the  ﬂow of funds, the timely and 
correct payment of wages, and the progress and quality of work.  
5.  The mate supervises the work at project sites. 
6.  The junior engineer measures the work output.  
7.  The gram sabha monitors registration and the issue of job cards, the work at the village level, and the employment provided.  
8.  A social audit of the gram panchayat NREGA bank account takes place through the gram sabha. 
 
Flow of funds 
i.  Upon the release of the labor budget, funds flow from the Ministry of Rural Development to the Government of Bihar. 
ii.  The funds then go from the Government of Bihar to the NREGA accounts of the districts.  
iii.  The funds then flow from the NREGA accounts of the districts to those of the gram panchayats. The latter are jointly operated by the gram 
panchayat president and the gram panchayat secretary. 
iv.  Upon completion of the work, funds are transferred from the gram panchayat to the bank or post office account of NREGA workers. 
v.  Upon completion of the work, the workers are paid through their bank or post office account.  
vi.  Until September 2008, NREGA workers were directly paid through the work implementing agent. 
 
Notes: The figure does not illustrate the interaction between parties in special cases such as the unavailability of employment. See the operational 
guidelines for more details (India, Ministry of Rural Development 2008). 
Wage payments are made through the implementing agent, which can be the gram panchayat, the taluk panchayat and zilla parishad, or 
government line departments, among others. Figure 2 is constructed assuming that the gram panchayat is the implementing agent of the REGS 
projects 
Source: Constructed from India, Ministry of Rural Development (2005). 
4.2.2 Governance Challenges 
This section emphasizes the evidence from Process-Influence Mapping interviews with one village focus 
group (Figure 3), one block program officer (Figure 4), and one employment guarantee assistant (Figure 
5) regarding the governance challenges in NREGA program implementation. The village focus group 
describes the implementation of taluk (block) panchayat–funded REGS at the village level, while the 
employment guarantee assistant describes the implementation of gram panchayat–funded REGS. The 
block program officer provides a general description. We supplement the discussion of the Process-
Influence Mapping with insights from interviews of service providers and NREGA beneficiaries in which 
the net-mapping approach could not be adequately applied. In order to structure the analysis, the 
discussion identifies the governance challenges prevailing at different stages of NREGA implementation, 
that is, planning, issuing of job cards, and work execution.  
A note of caution is required. The administrative procedures presented here reflect the 
implementation of NREGA as it is understood by various respondents. Actors or lines of administrative 
responsibility and fund flows may not coincide with the provisions of the operational guidelines, as the 
interviewees are only aware of the procedures that they are directly exposed to.  
i.  Project Planning 
The village focus group in Block A-A (Figure 3) presents the administrative process involved in the 
implementation of a taluk panchayat–funded REGS. The illustrations suggest that taluk panchayat–funded 
projects are implemented without the involvement of the gram panchayat. Instead, the implementation 
appears to depend on a farmers’ committee, which identifies the NREGA-related activities. As the 
farmers’ committee may promote activities that are of direct concern to the committee members, taluk 
panchayat–funded REGS may face problems arising from local elite capture and targeting failures. 
Additional support for this proposition is provided by the fact that the taluk panchayat–funded REGS was 
only implemented in the gram panchayat that the taluk panchayat member came from. This observation 
suggests that REGS funded and implemented through taluk panchayats may not cover a wider set of gram 
panchayats as envisaged in the block plan.  16 
Figure 3. NREGA implementation: Village focus group in Block A-A, April 2008 
Panel A: Influence of actors   
 
 
Panel B: Perceived corruption of actors 
 
1.  Decides about NREGA activities; informs. 
2.  Sends proposal for approval. 
3.  Informs about approval. 
4.  Informs about start of work. 
5.  Asks for estimate. 
6.  Goes to village; makes estimate. 
7.  Informs about estimate. 
8.  Calls; gives advance money. 
9.  Informs about advance money. 
10.  Informs to get people ready. 
11.  Issues employment cards and maintains attendance sheet. 
12.  Supervises flow of money. 
13.  Measures work and maintains books. 
14.  Informs about work done. 
15.  Provides money for work (signs checks). 
16.  Informs about money received. 
17.  Distributes money. 
(3.) Until 2007, informed about approval. 
Source: Authors. 17 
Based on the evidence from the interview with the block program officer and the employment 
guarantee assistant in Block B-A, the priority areas of work are identified during gram sabha meetings. 
Contrary to the provisions of the Act, the priority areas are not communicated to the gram panchayat and 
incorporated into the annual plan. Instead, they are directly communicated to the taluk panchayat. As 
there is evidence that gram sabha meetings are attended by villagers with vested interests (see Drèze, 
Khera, and Siddhartha 2007), the set of priority areas may favor only a few people, and this in turn may 
reduce the commitment of villagers to program implementation.  
Perhaps due to lack of awareness or irrelevance to their own tasks, the village focus group (Figure 
3) and block program officer (Figure 4) do not assign the block program officer a role in the project 
planning procedure. According to the interviewees, the block program officer does not receive the gram 
panchayat or block development plan for technical scrutiny and approval, while he or she may receive a 
final list of projects after the approval of the zilla parishad (Figures 3 and 5).  
If the lack of involvement of the block program officer is typical for the implementation of 
NREGA, then development plans may (1) specify budget requirements that are too low to fund sufficient 
employment and (2) approve projects that are too small to generate sufficient employment for all 
concerned, as the block program officer is responsible for matching the demand for work at the block 
level with the employment opportunities. Given the interview responses of the block program officer, the 
underestimation of funding requirements appears to be a binding constraint in the generation of NREGA 
employment. The constraint is such that households receive NREGA employment for a period of only 15 
days.  
Figure 4. NREGA implementation: Block program officer in Block B-A, January 2009 
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Figure 4. Continued 
 
Implementation process 
1.  The worker demands a job card. 
2.  The worker channels the job card application to the employment guarantee assistant (EGA). 
3.  The EGA signs and issues the job card. 
4.  The worker submits the application for employment. 
5.  The block program officer forwards the application for employment to the EGA. 
6.  The worker demands employment from the block program officer and the EGA. 
7.  The block program officer informs about and transfers the employment applications to the EGA. 
8.  The EGA informs the people about the shelf of projects from which they can choose the NREGA projects. 
9.  The EGA informs about the selected NREGA work/scheme and asks for a cost estimate and technical approval. The technical approval is 
obtained from (1) the panchayat technical assistant for schemes of less than 1 lakh Rs. and (2) the junior engineer for schemes of more than 1 
lakh Rs.  
10. The junior engineer seeks technical approval from (1) the assistant engineer for schemes of 2–5 lakh Rs. and (2) the executive engineer for 
schemes of more than 5 lakh Rs. 
11. The gram panchayat president receives the technical approval from (1) the panchayat technical assistant for schemes of less than 1 lakh Rs. 
and (2) the junior engineer for schemes of 1–2 lakh Rs.  
12. The block program officer is contacted for the administrative approval of 2–5 lakh Rs. schemes and the district development commissioner is 
contacted for administrative approval of more than 5 lakh Rs. schemes. 
13. The gram panchayat president grants the administrative approval and asks the EGA to start schemes of less than 1 lakh Rs. The block 
program officer grants the administrative approval and asks the EGA to start 1–5 lakh Rs. schemes. The district development commissioner 
grants the administrative approval and asks the EGA to start schemes of more than 5 lakh Rs. 
14. The EGA informs rural workers about the start of the work within 15 days. 
15. The EGA monitors the NREGA work/scheme implementation. 
16. The EGA informs about the completion of the work and asks the panchayat technical assistant (for schemes of less than 1 lakh Rs.) and the 
junior engineer (for schemes of more than 1 lakh Rs.) for the measurement book. The junior engineer informs about the completion of the 
work and asks the assistant engineer and executive engineer (for schemes of more than 2 lakh Rs.) for the measurement book.  
17. The administrative release of funds takes place. 
18. The joint signature of the gram panchayat president and the EGA releases the funds to the EGA. 
19. As of September 2008, the EGA sends a consolidated statement of the workers’ NREGA earnings to the bank or post office. 
20. The EGA informs the workers about the money transfer to the bank or post office. 
(19.) Until September 2008, the EGA paid workers directly in cash. 
 
Planning process 
A.  The gram panchayat president calls the gram sabha to decide the NREGA projects for the next year. 
B.  Projects selected in the gram sabha are sent to the taluk panchayat for approval. 
C.  The taluk panchayat informs about the approval of projects. 
D.  The zilla parishad informs about the approval of the taluk or gram panchayat work/schemes. 
E.  The gram panchayat president and EGA jointly decide the work/scheme out of the set of schemes approved by the zilla parishad. 
Note: The Process-Influence Map is characterized by a number of simultaneous rather than consecutive processes. Entries A to E denote the 
process of selecting NREGA work/schemes. 
Source: Authors. 
In addition, if the block program officer is not involved in the planning process, development 
plans might be passed that do not reflect local priorities and needs but generate employment without 
increasing the local potential for productivity and income gains (in agriculture) or that fail to promote 
activities targeted toward weaker sections of the society (for example, land development projects for 
small and marginal farmers).  
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Figure 5. NREGA implementation: Employment guarantee assistant in Block B-A, January 2009 
 
Implementation process 
1.  The worker demands a job card. 
2.  The gram panchayat president provides background information on the economic status of the applicant. 
3.  The employment guarantee assistant (EGA) verifies the application and issues the job card. 
4.  The worker submits the application for employment to the EGA or the block program officer (in the absence of the EGA). 
5.  The block program officer forwards the employment application to the EGA. 
6.  The EGA informs the block program officer about the number of applications. 
7.  The gram panchayat president grants the administrative approval for and asks the EGA to start schemes of less than 1 lakh Rs. The block 
program officer grants the administrative approval for and asks the EGA to start schemes of 1–5 lakh Rs.  
8.  The EGA asks (1) the panchayat technical assistant for the technical approval of schemes of less than 1 lakh Rs. and (2) the junior engineer 
and assistant executive engineer for the technical approval of schemes of more than 1 lakh Rs.  
9.  The panchayat technical assistant, junior engineer, and assistant executive engineer send the technical approval letter. 
10.  The EGA informs the block program officer about the formal start of the work. 
11.  The gram sabha selects one laborer per work site to be the mate. The mate maintains the attendance sheet. 
12.  Work supervision is provided by the junior engineer and panchayat technical assistant. 
13.  The measurement book is prepared, which is then submitted to the EGA. 
14.  The EGA computes the consolidated amount of salaries and issues a check, which is signed by both the EGA and the gram panchayat 
president. The check is sent to the bank or post office. 
 
Planning process 
A.  The gram sabha identifies NREGA projects for the next year. 
B.  The gram panchayat sends the projects for approval to the taluk panchayat. 
C.  The taluk panchayat forwards the list with the schemes to the zilla parishad. 
D.  The zilla parishad approves the schemes received from the taluk panchayat and sends the final list of projects to the block program officer. 
The block program officer selects schemes that can employ the required number of people. 
 
Source: Authors. 
Note:   The Process-Influence Map is characterized by a number of simultaneous rather than consecutive processes. 
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ii.  Registration and Issuing of Job Cards  
According to the provisions of NREGA, the gram panchayat is required to receive the applications for 
registration, verify the registration applications, register households, and issue employment cards. The 
village focus group interview suggests that employment cards are reviewed by the taluk panchayat and 
issued by the employment guarantee assistant. The information for verification of the household’s 
economic status is provided by the gram panchayat president, who in Bihar is referred to as Mukhiya.  
The Process-Influence Maps suggest that the block program officer does not receive information 
on the number of job card applicants. Again, we cannot conclude that this is a general characteristic of 
NREGA implementation, as it may reflect the lack of awareness of the interview respondents. However, 
if it holds true, then estimates of how many programs are needed in order to meet the prospective 
employment demand might be unreliable. In addition, according to the perceptions of the village focus 
group (Figure 3), employment demand is made to fit supply, as employment cards are issued only after 
projects have been identified and project funds received. Although this finding casts doubt on the extent 
to which employment generation is right- and need-based and inclusive, it should not be overemphasized, 
as it reflects the perceptions of the interviewees, which could be imperfect reflections of reality.  
The case study evidence also points to financial irregularities in the job card issue procedure. In 
line with the CAG report finding, a group of REGS workers in Block B-A pointed out that the gram 
panchayat president required households applying for job cards to pay Rs. 10 per household applicant, 
both at the time of submitting the job card application form and at the time of receiving the issued job 
card. The cost for the photographs had to be borne by the job card applicants as well, despite the clear 
operational guideline that the cost of the photographs and the job card are part of the program cost. The 
focus group of REGS workers also complained that the gram panchayat president issued the job cards 
only to those who had voted for him during the gram panchayat election or those close to him. On a 
closely related note, the interview responses point to the existence of caste conflicts in the issuing and 
distribution of job cards. For instance, the village focus group argued that the gram panchayat president 
preferentially issued job cards to members of his own caste within the Scheduled Caste group, while 
members of lower Scheduled Castes were less likely to receive them. 
iii.  Allocation of Employment Opportunities, Work Execution, and Wage Payments 
NREGA mandates the allocation of employment opportunities through the block program officer and the 
gram panchayat. In order to coordinate projects and employment at the block level, the gram panchayat is 
mandated to inform the block program officer about the job allocation. However, the interviewees 
perceive that this is hardly ever done. According to the perceptions of the employment guarantee assistant 
in Block B-A, he is the only one who communicates the start of the work to the block program officer 
(Figure 5).  
In addition, the Act mandates notification through a public notice at the offices of the gram 
panchayat and the block program officer and through the mail, but it is not evident whether this 
transparent process is actually followed. It could be due to the respondents’ limited understanding of what 
is going on at the district level that none of them mentioned the district program coordinator as the 
authority who coordinates with the block program officer and the gram panchayat (or other implementing 
agents) to ensure the generation of 100 days of REGS employment per household per year. Lack of 
awareness may therefore also explain why the results of the Process-Influence Map point to the complete 
detachment of REGS work allocation and execution from the district program coordinator.  
It remains unclear to what extent the findings from the Process-Influence Mapping exercise are 
also the outcome of staff shortages. In particular, the implementation of REGS is complicated by staff 
shortages at all government levels in Bihar. The shortages are due to substantial policy-driven restraints 
on the new hiring of district- and block-level staff and the consequent adverse development of the age 
composition of staff. As vacancies are not (permanently) filled, block- and district-level staff are 
frequently assigned several posts.
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14 In order to deal with manpower shortage in spite of government regulations against new hiring, some employment takes 
 For instance, one block development officer from Block A-B made it 21 
clear in the interview that he had been assigned responsibility for six additional posts, with the post of 
block program officer being just one of his responsibilities. In another interview in District A, the district 
program coordinator was found to be the district development commissioner. Obviously, the workload 
associated with each position implies that the respective interviewee could not act as a full-time block 
program officer or district program coordinator, and accordingly could not pay the required attention to or 
effectively monitor or administer the implementation of NREGA.
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Given the manpower problems (from unfilled vacancies) and the consequent lack of supervision, 
the 2008 NREGA operational guidelines specify the introduction of a “mate” who is supposed to be 
selected twice a month from the pool of REGS workers “through a fair, transparent and participatory 
process” (India, Ministry of Rural Development 2008, 30). After training, the selected REGS workers are 
meant to become responsible for the local supervision and monitoring of work sites. As this includes the 
maintenance of Muster Rolls at the work site and assessments regarding the quality of work, mates may 
not only reduce the workload of the employment guarantee assistant but also increase the transparency 
and accountability of REGS work implementation. In the case study interviews, the employment 
guarantee assistant in Block B-A referred to the mate as an actor who matters for the generation of 
NREGA-related wage employment by maintaining the attendance sheet. One mate was said to be selected 
per work site from the pool of REGS workers during gram sabha meetings.  
 
In addition to the introduction of mates, the Government of Bihar attempted to alleviate the 
manpower problems and the consequent high workload by hiring specific staff for the implementation of 
the REGS outside the civil service and on a contract basis. For instance, the employment guarantee 
assistant in Block B-A was hired on a contract basis to support the gram panchayat. Implementation of 
NREGA projects through contractors, despite the ban on private contractors under NREGA, could be in 
response to the shortage of manpower (as it takes time for the measures to become effective) but also due 
to the traditional importance of contractors as employers of unskilled labor in Bihar. In District B, the 
REGS workers in Block A carried out work related to the renovation of traditional water bodies and the 
desilting of two tanks. Contrary to the provisions of NREGA, the project was given to a contractor, who 
was associated with the political elite and deprived REGS workers of approximately 40 percent of the 
their wage entitlement. Instead of the agreed-upon wage of Rs. 82, the workers received only Rs. 50 per 
day. 
The role of a contractor as implementing agent of NREGA-related projects and the associated 
misappropriation of funds illustrates the imperfect functioning of public vigilance. The NREGA 
operational guidelines request the formation of one Vigilance and Monitoring Committee for every 
project sanctioned to ensure transparency and accountability in NREGA program implementation. We 
could not find support for the existence of Vigilance and Monitoring Committees in the collected case 
studies. In addition, neither the interviewed employment guarantee assistant in Block B-A nor the block 
program officer in Block B-A mentioned their mandated responsibility to ensure the implementation and 
organization of social audits. This could be indicative of the absence of social audits (see Drèze, Khera, 
and Siddhartha [2007] for comparable evidence from Orissa) and thus of the absence of a platform that 
could promote accountability and transparency in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation of NREGA projects. 
In addition to the contracting work, the evidence from the Process-Influence Mapping tool 
suggests that corruption may also exist at the level of those authorities that assess the technical feasibility 
of project work and provide cost estimates of project implementation (meaning panchayat technical 
assistant, junior engineer, assistant engineer, and executive engineer). In fact, the village focus group 
respondents in Block A-A considered the junior engineer (overseer) to be one of the most corrupt agents 
in the implementation of NREGA (Figure 3, panel B).
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place on a contract basis.  
 The respective Process-Influence Mapping 
15 Also see Drèze, Khera, and Siddhartha (2007) for comparable evidence from Orissa. 
16 The junior engineer is appointed at the level of the block, of which he may or may not be a resident. As effective 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms do not adequately function, the junior engineer’s ability to misappropriate funds does 
not depend on his ability to collude with the REGS workers. That is, resources can be directly diverted from the REGS workers. 22 
method helps identify the chain of mutually reinforcing actions through which junior engineers can 
misappropriate funds. For example, the taluk panchayat asks the junior engineer to provide estimates of 
the costs associated with a particular REGS (step 5)
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The ability to control corruption at the technical level depends on the existence of well-
functioning monitoring mechanisms (including the monitoring capacity of the block program officer and 
the district magistrate) and enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, incentive schemes for the technical 
staff are needed that increase the incentives to perform regular and reliable verifications and audits of the 
completed projects. In addition to corruption at the technical level, the interviewed employment guarantee 
assistant (Figure 5) also complained about the corrupt behavior of politically powerful villagers. The 
latter initiate disputes about the geographic area of NREGA work sites and pose financial requests in 
exchange for giving permission to get NREGA work started at particular work sites.  
. As the junior engineer also measures the work and 
maintains related books (step 13), in the absence of effective supervision and accountability mechanisms 
he can provide estimates (step 7) that exceed the true cost of work. Because the junior engineer also signs 
the document that authorizes the release of funds, he may siphon off the difference between the true cost 
and the excess estimate, or share this difference with other actors involved. 
Finally, the evidence from the Process-Influence Mapping tool suggests that corruption may also 
exist at the level of the employment guarantee assistant and block program officer, that is, those 
authorities that administer and handle the management of funds associated with the implementation of 
REGS and the associated wage payments. The village focus group in Block A-A assumed that 
approximately one-third of the NREGA funds were misused. Although the research team had no 
opportunity to cross-check this figure, the Process-Influence Mapping tool can be used to assess the scope 
for corruption by identifying the channels through which funds can be misused.  
The evidence from the village focus group interview (Figure 3) indicates that taluk panchayat–
funded REGS involve the flow of funds from the block program officer (step 8 and 15) to the 
employment guarantee assistant and the subsequent distribution in the form of wages to labor groups (step 
17). In the absence of adequate supervision and monitoring mechanisms, the block program officer and 
employment guarantee assistant might be corrupt along three related avenues. First, the block program 
officer authorizes the release of advanced and final payments to the employment guarantee assistant once 
he receives the work approval (step 3) and the information regarding work completion (step 14), 
respectively. The block program officer can siphon off funds by turning a blind eye on junior engineers if 
they submit cost estimates and work output measures that are too high in comparison to conventional 
estimates (step 7 and 14). Block program officers and junior engineers may share the differential between 
excess cost and true cost. Second, a corrupt employment guarantee assistant may deprive workers of their 
true wage entitlements (step 11 and 17) by imposing arbitrary upper bounds on the maximum daily output 
that qualifies for wage payments or by withholding the required minimum wage payment. Third, the 
employment guarantee assistant may demand money from job card applicants for issuing the employment 
card (step 11). 
Due to the problem of misappropriation of funds through project implementing agencies, the 
2008 operational guidelines introduced the payment of wages through the bank or post office network so 
as to separate payment agencies from implementing agencies. The interviews with the block program 
officer and employment guarantee assistant in Block B-A (Figures 4 and 5, respectively) suggest that this 
administrative change requires the employment guarantee assistant to submit a consolidated statement of 
workers’ earnings to the bank or post office (see Figure 4, step 19, and Figure 5, step 14). The operational 
guidelines state that bank and post office accounts should be opened on behalf of the concerned REGS 
workers by an appropriate authority (for example, bank or gram panchayat). Given the experience with 
the job card application procedure, concerns prevail regarding the extent to which intermediaries can 
facilitate equitable access to bank accounts for all REGS workers or households.  
The experience with the job card application procedure suggests that intermediaries may impose a 
fee for the opening of a bank account. As this increases the opportunity costs of applying for employment 
                                                       
17 Steps refer to the activities displayed in Figure 3 that lead to the provision of NREGA-related wage employment. 23 
under NREGA, it may deter potential REGS workers from applying for NREGA work. Furthermore, 
there is evidence that banks refused to open bank accounts for REGS workers because the consequent 
additional administrative burden results in additional costs. In addition, the block program officer and 
employment guarantee assistant in Block B-A (Figures 4 and 5, respectively) point to problems in the use 
of bank accounts and delays in the payment of wages when made through banks.  
REGS workers must tell the bank in advance when they plan to withdraw the money, as they 
cannot keep a large amount of funds after closure. Drèze and Khera (2008) argue that the move toward 
bank payments is not a sufficient means for creating accountability in NREGA implementation, as the 
banking system is prone to corruption as well. Drèze and Khera (2008) even argue that the move to bank 
payments has reduced transparency in NREGA wage payments, because banks are not subject to the same 
transparency and publication rules of key NREGA documents (such as Muster Rolls) as the NREGA 
implementing agents. Another problem concerns the scattered location of bank and post office branches, 
which reduces the accounts’ accessibility and increases the opportunity costs of REGS workers to visit 
banks, not to mention the high transaction costs and the time involved.  
iv.  Influence of Actors on the Actual NREGA Implementation Outcomes 
So far, the Process-Influence Mapping tool has been analyzed with respect to the steps that are taken to 
provide NREGA employment and wage payments to the unskilled poor in rural areas. This section 
summarizes the answers to the question: How much influence do the various actors have on the outcome 
of the REGS? As can be inferred from the size of the nodes in Figures 3 to 5, the interviewees differ in 
their perceptions regarding the importance of various actors. We represent differences in the importance 
of actors for the generation of NREGA wage employment by varying the size of nodes in the maps. The 
smaller the nodes, the less important a particular actor is perceived to be in providing wage employment.  
Given their view on the implementation of REGS, the block program officer (Figure 4) and 
employment guarantee assistant (Figure 5) consider the NREGA beneficiaries to be most important for 
providing NREGA wage employment, as they are the ones who initiate the NREGA process by 
demanding employment. However, the respondents from the village focus group (Figure 3) do not share 
this perception; they consider the zilla parishad, as the district authority that sanctions all projects, to be 
most influential in the results of NREGA implementation. Except for the zilla parishad, the Process-
Influence Mapping exercise suggests that the dominant share of the interview respondents do not consider 
the district- or state-level functionaries to be influential to the generation of NREGA wage employment. 
Their role appears to be largely confined to the intermediation of funds. At least the employment 
guarantee assistant also assigns importance to the newly created function of the mate. However, as the 
mate does not appear to report to any other institution, the associated maintenance of attendance sheets 
may not strengthen supervision over work execution and the payment of workers. 
Finally, the maps suggest that responsibilities in the administration of REGS per se may provide 
an imperfect view of the perceived importance of actors in the implementation of projects. A case in point 
is the village focus group, which assigned the largest influence to the zilla parishad in spite of its 
proposed limited role in the implementation of REGS.  24 
5. CONCLUSION 
What Can Be Done to Overcome the Governance Challenges? 
Using the insights gained from Process-Influence Mapping, this paper has pointed to a number of 
governance challenges in the implementation of NREGA that limit the effectiveness of the program. The 
findings are largely consistent with the literature reviewed in Section 3. The use of the mapping tool, 
however, made it possible to identify some challenges that have received less attention in the literature 
and to provide more detailed insights regarding the specific features of the implementation process that 
create scope for the misappropriation of funds. We conclude this paper with an overview of the five main 
NREGA implementation problems as revealed by the Process-Influence Mapping tool, and discuss 
possible solutions. 
5.1. Elite Capture in the Definition of Projects 
Consistent with the existing literature, this paper shows that district and block officials play a limited role 
in defining the block and district plans for the generation of NREGA employment. However, while the 
existing literature (for example, the CAG audit report and PACS-CSO report) emphasized the lack of 
capacity of district and block officials to define the respective plans, the evidence from Process-Influence 
Mapping also points to inadequate transparency and accountability mechanisms, which enable interest 
groups such as farmers’ committees to exercise power in defining the priority areas of NREGA-related 
projects. As a consequence, the projects may favor the interests of this particular group, whereas the gram 
panchayat, as a more inclusive body (with mandated reservation of seats for women and Scheduled Caste 
and Tribe members), might have chosen different projects. The case study also indicates that this problem 
can arise when taluk panchayat members implement projects that do not cover several gram panchayats 
(as foreseen under this mechanism), but rather cover only the location in which they reside. In such cases, 
it seems easy for taluk panchayat members to exclude the gram panchayat members from participating in 
the decision process, and instead involve interest groups that are close to them. This problem requires 
more attention in the future, as it may indicate that the share of work to be implemented by the gram 
panchayats, taluk panchayats, and zilla panchayats should be changed to favor the gram panchayats. 
5.2. Exclusion in Issuing of Job Cards 
It is well known from the literature and from the case studies that rural people face problems in obtaining 
NREGA employment cards. It is also well known that many factors account for the failure of people to 
receive the employment cards, especially corruption on the part of the card issuer. The Process-Influence 
Mapping exercise highlighted the role of local politics as an additional factor and showed that exclusion 
from receipt of employment cards can also arise due to caste conflicts within the Scheduled Caste group. 
At the core of the problem observed in the case study were electoral politics of the gram panchayat 
president and the (Scheduled Caste) rural people’s lack of voice to express their right-based demand for 
NREGA employment. In order to improve the access of the rural population in general and of minorities 
in particular to NREGA-related services, it may be useful to concentrate more on awareness-creation 
campaigns that are targeted at disadvantaged (Scheduled Caste) citizens and inform them about their 
rights and duties, existing grievance mechanisms, the NREGA implementation process, and the agents 
involved.  
5.3. Lack of Awareness and Capacity among Rural Citizens 
The need for capacity building among rural citizens seeking NREGA employment is not well recognized 
in the literature, which may be related to the challenge of inherent capacity building at that level. For 
instance, the PACS-CSO report (2007) mainly emphasizes the need for strengthening the knowledge and 
skills of elected representatives. The Process-Influence Mapping tool could be used to identify areas in 25 
which the mobilization of people and awareness-creation and capacity-strengthening activities could help 
increase the effectiveness of NREGA simply by removing structural and procedural misunderstandings 
regarding the implementation of the program and the responsibilities of the various actors. In addition to 
the prevailing lack of awareness, one interviewee attributed the limited effectiveness of NREGA to the 
value system of workers who are quick to assume that public programs are “gifts” provided by politicians 
to poor people. In order to strengthen the capacity of people to demand, monitor, and evaluate NREGA-
related services, a “value for work” attitude needs to be developed that creates a sense of ownership over 
program implementation. In addition, Process-Influence Mapping can be used as a tool to identify 
possible changes in the administrative structure, together with officials and stakeholders, that could help 
increase the transparency and accountability of NREGA program implementation. Entry points for 
providing demand-based, inclusive, and adequate NREGA employment could involve the mobilization of 
local people through self-help groups and other local groups and through media campaigns that are 
specifically designed to help rural citizens claim their rights under NREGA. Improvements in the 
availability of information related to, for example, tenders and contracts and progress reports would also 
help, even though a stronger sensitization of the public may be required for effective use of such 
documents for oversight purposes.
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5.4. Misappropriation of Funds 
 
The problem related to the misappropriation of funds is widely documented in the literature, specifically 
in the audit reports discussed in Section 3, but Process-Influence Mapping made it possible to specify 
more clearly where and how scope for misappropriation and corruption is created in the system. The 
Process-Influence Mapping exercise suggests that misappropriation is fostered by the complex structure 
of the administrative system and the program design. Although resulting from the best of intentions to 
minimize corruption through the creation of an extensive check-and-balance system, the complex 
administrative system facilitates the misappropriation of funds, as it adversely affects program monitoring 
and evaluation. Although manpower shortages and capacity constraints partially explain insufficient 
program monitoring and evaluation, additional hiring and training of staff may not necessarily reduce or 
even eliminate corruption as long as the scope for misappropriation is high. Hence, the case study shows 
that there are trade-offs—between creating additional checks and balances and keeping the system 
simple—that need to be considered in further reforming the system. Moreover, in line with the existing 
literature, the study suggests that sustainable solutions to corruption require the mobilization of rural 
people to become responsible for regular vigilance and monitoring, as they are the ones who have the 
strongest stake in the ultimate outcome of the program.  
As the mobilization of rural people involves a time-consuming process, the Government of India 
seeks to limit the misuse of funds and corruption by separating the payment agencies from the 
implementing agencies and by making different agents responsible for the maintenance of Muster Rolls 
and the payment of wages. To this end, the Government of India mandated the introduction of bank or 
post office accounts. The Process-Influence Map for block panchayat–funded REGS (Figure 3) indicates 
that this approach may in fact increase the effectiveness of the REGS, as it eliminates those money flows 
that induce corruption among the employment guarantee assistant, junior engineer, and block program 
officer. As argued in Section 4.2.2, the introduction of financial intermediaries is associated with new 
challenges, which include increased transaction costs (in terms of time required) for program beneficiaries 
to access their payments. Still, the separation of payment and implementing agencies through the 
introduction of bank accounts appears to be a step in the right direction, provided it is associated with 
effective safeguard accountability and transparency mechanisms.  
The use of technology is another avenue to improve vigilance over program implementation. In 
fact, Internet and software tools are increasingly considered to be useful means of meeting the demand for 
                                                       
18 See http://www.solutionexchange-un.net.in/emp/cr-public/cr-se-emp-decn-03040601-public.pdf for a 
discussion of how to strengthen vigilance and reporting under NREGA.  26 
data collection and reporting. For instance, the Government of Bihar recently decided to use biometric 
devices when introducing the e-Muster Roll, with the objective of improving the transparency of Muster 
Roll entries and ensuring timely and appropriate wage payments.
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5.5. Lack of Capacity due to Staff Shortages and Lack of Training 
 The biometric readers, currently being 
successfully pilot tested in Andhra Pradesh, store the fingerprints and photographs of NREGA program 
beneficiaries and record the number of days worked and the date and time of wage payments. The 
information is ultimately stored in a central online database that traces all transactions and facilitates the 
timely availability of project implementation information. In addition to ensuring the unique identification 
of the NREGA beneficiaries, the biometric card will be able to eliminate all cash transactions once banks 
integrate it with their own technology. The main binding constraint in the operation of the biometric 
devices might not be electric power supply, as the devices run on battery power, but the availability of a 
sufficient number of people who can properly use and maintain the devices. In addition, banks might be 
reluctant to incur the efforts of integrating another technology—a problem that might be particularly 
pronounced in remote rural areas where banks are sparsely located and poorly computerized. 
Nevertheless, the use of such technologies offers unique opportunities to meet some of the governance 
challenges inherent in implementing NREGA. 
The Process-Influence Mapping exercise suggests that many challenges arise because NREGA 
implementing agents and public officials are not sufficiently trained or related posts are vacant. These 
challenges are well known to the Government of India and—given the government’s strong support of the 
program—steps have been taken to address them by assigning responsibilities for program 
implementation to contracted nongovernmental agents and/or by modifying the administrative structure of 
NREGA implementation.  
As regards training, the NREGA operational guidelines emphasize the importance of 
strengthening the capacity of all agents involved in NREGA planning, implementation, measurement, 
monitoring, and evaluation to meet their respective responsibilities. Unfortunately, the guidelines are 
silent on who is responsible for the specification of the envisaged training calendar and training modules. 
In order to facilitate access to training, information regarding the source of training and conditions for 
training eligibility should be easily accessible. In many instances, training needs to be provided to agents 
who are employed for a limited period of time and/or on a contract basis (such as employment guarantee 
assistant, block program officer). The training of temporarily employed agents such as the employment 
guarantee assistant is resource-intensive and difficult to manage because of a high turnover rate and the 
sheer number of required employment workers. Proposed strategies such as the training of (master) 
trainers with the active participation of NGOs could increase the outreach of training but also require 
additional resources for the supervision of the NGOs.  
In order to effectively alleviate the constraints from unfilled vacancies, new functionaries have 
been introduced, such as the mate. In addition, the Government of Bihar has moved away from its 
stringent policy of no new hiring. The Process-Influence Mapping instrument can be used to gain a better 
understanding of the channels through which the introduction of additional (support) staff (for example, 
mate) affects the procedural and administrative implementation of REGS and thus employment 
generation. 
Overall, the case confirms that in program implementation, the “devil is in the details,” and 
catching this devil is important to identifying reform options. Participatory techniques such as Process-
Influence Mapping can be used to help create a better understanding of the intricacies of implementing 
complex large-scale programs such as NREGA and to assess possible solutions. The authors hope that the 
insights from the case study will help the government and the stakeholders involved in their continued 
efforts to realize the vision of NREGA as an innovative rights-based answer to the long-standing 
challenge of providing social safety to India’s rural poor. 
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE 
Table A.1. Summary of the roles and responsibilities of the key agencies 
  Administrative level  Agent/agency  Responsibility under NREGA 
Elected local 
governments 
District (zilla)  Zilla panchayat (or 
zilla parishad) 
Preparation of district plans and labor budget. 
Monitoring and supervision of REGS activities.  
Block (taluk)  Taluk panchayat  Identification of priority areas of REGS activities. 
Consolidation of the gram panchayat plans at the 
block level into a block plan. Proposal, scrutiny, and 
approval of district plan REGS activities. Monitoring 
and supervision of REGS activities.  
Village (gram)  Gram panchayat  Identification of priority areas of REGS activities. 
Proposal, scrutiny, and approval of respective REGS 
projects. Execution, monitoring, and auditing of gram 









block, or village 
level) 
Central government  Ministry of Rural 
Development 
Nodal agency for NREGA implementation. Resource 
provision and assessment of resource use and 
NREGA processes and outcomes. 
   Central Employment 
Guarantee Council 
Review, monitoring, and evaluation of NREGA-
related activities. 
State  State government  Formulation of REGS. 
   State Employment 
Guarantee Council 
Review, monitoring, and evaluation of REGS 
activities. Resource allocation and administrative, 
financial, and technical support to local government 
tiers. 
District (zilla)  District program 
coordinator 
Overall responsibility for REGS implementation. 
Scrutiny and approval of the plan proposals of all 
taluk panchayats; consolidation of a district plan 
proposal. Release and utilization of funds. Monitoring 
and supervision of REGS activities. Performance 
assessment of employment guarantee assistant. 
   Technical Resource 
Support Group 
Assessment of the technical feasibility and cost 
efficiency of district plan REGS activities. 
Supervision and evaluation of REGS work 
implementation.  
Block (taluk)  Block program officer 
(previously block 
development officer) 
NREGA coordinator at the block level. Technical 
sanction/approval of the gram panchayat annual plan 
of REGS activities. Submission of a consolidated 
statement of approved block-level proposals to the 
taluk panchayat. Performance assessment of 
employment guarantee assistant. Monitoring and 
supervision of REGS activities, including the 
implementation of a social audit by the gram sabhas. 
   Junior engineer  Assessment of the technical feasibility and cost 
efficiency of district plan REGS activities. 
Supervision and evaluation of REGS work 
implementation.  
Village (gram)  Employment guarantee 
assistant 
Monitoring of REGS work implementation at the 
village level and maintenance of REGS-related 
documents. Responsible for the process of 
registration, distribution of job cards, work allocation, 
wage payments, etc. 
Source: India, Ministry of Rural Development (2008). 
 28 
REFERENCES 
Ambasta, P., P. S. Vijay Shankar, and M. Shah. 2008. Two years of NREGA: The road ahead. Economic and 
Political Weekly 43 (8): 41–50. 
Comptroller and Auditor General. 2008. Performance audit of implementation of National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act, 2005 (NREGA). Performance Audit Report No. 42. New Delhi, India: Comptroller and 
Auditor General. 
Drèze, J., and R. Khera. 2008. From accounts to accountability. The Hindu, December 6. 
<http://www.sacw.net/article382.html>. Accessed March 21, 2009. 
Drèze, J., R. Khera, and Siddhartha. 2007. NREGA in Orissa: Ten loopholes and the silver lining. Interim Survey 
Report, October 21. Allahabad, India: University of Allahabad. 
<http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/gbpant07orissa-social-audit-interim-report.pdf>. Accessed March 
21, 2009. 
Drèze, J., and C. Oldiges. 2007. Commendable act. Frontline 24 (14). 
India, Ministry of Rural Development. 2005. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 (NREGA): 
Operational guidelines. New Delhi, India: Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Rural 
Development. 
________. 2008. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 (NREGA): Operational guidelines 2008. 3rd 
ed. New Delhi, India: Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Rural Development. 
<http://nrega.nic.in/NREGA_guidelinesEng.pdf>. Accessed March 16, 2009. 
Narayanan, S. 2008. Employment guarantee, women’s work and childcare. Economic and Political Weekly 43 (9): 
10–13. 
NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act). 2005. No. 42 OF 2005. 
<http://www.commonlii.org/in/legis/num_act/nrega2005375>. Accessed September 5, 2008. 
PACS-CSO (Poorest Area Civil Society – Civil Society Organization). 2007. Status of NREGA implementation: 
Grassroots learning and ways forward. 2nd monitoring report (April 2006 to March 2007). Delhi, India: 
Poorest Area Civil Society (PACS) Program. 
Pritchett, L., and M. Woolcock. 2004. Solutions when the solution is the problem: Arraying the disarray in 
development. World Development 32, 191–212. 
Schiffer, E. and D. Waale. 2008. Tracing power and influence in networks: Net-map as a tool for research and 
strategic network planning. Discussion Paper No. 00772. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy 
Research Institute. 
Shah, M. 2008. Governance reform key to NREGA success. The Hindu, March 14. 
Siddhartha, and A. Vanaik. 2008. CAG report on NREGA: Fact and fiction. Economic and Political Weekly 43: 39–
45.  
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2009. Employment guarantee quickening India’s march towards 
MDGs. Report on an international seminar on rural poverty: Key initiatives in achieving Millennium 
Development Goals and the role of NREGA, January 21–22, 2009, National Agricultural Science Centre, 
New Delhi. New York: United Nations Development Programme. < http://undp.org.in/node/213>. 
Accessed March 14, 2010. 
World Bank. 2007. Tools for institutional, political, and social analysis of policy reform: A sourcebook for 
development practitioners. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
    
RECENT IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS 
For earlier discussion papers, please go to http://www.ifpri.org/publications/results/taxonomy%3A468. 
All discussion papers can be downloaded free of charge. 
962.  Droughts and floods in Malawi: Assessing the economywide effects. Karl Pauw, James Thurlow, and Dirk van Seventer, 
2010. 
961.  Climate change implications for water resources in the Limpopo River Basin. Tingju Zhu and Claudia Ringler , 2010. 
960.  Hydro-economic modeling of climate change impacts in Ethiopia. Gene Jiing-Yun You and Claudia Ringler, 2010. 
959.  Promises and realities of community-based agricultural extension. Gershon Feder, Jock R. Anderson, Regina Birner, and 
Klaus Deininger, 2010.  
958.  Rethinking the global food crisis: The role of trade shocks. Derek D. Headey, 2010. 
957.  Female participation in African agricultural research and higher education - New insights: Synthesis of the ASTI–award 
benchmarking survey on gender-disaggregated capacity indicators. Nienke M. Beintema and Federica Di Marcantonio, 
2010. 
956.  Short- and long-term effects of the 1998 Bangladesh Flood on rural wages. Valerie Mueller and Agnes Quisumbing, 
2010. 
955.  Impacts of the triple global crisis on growth and poverty in Yemen. Clemens Breisinger, Marie-Helen Collion, Xinshen 
Diao, and Pierre Rondot, 2010. 
954.  Agricultural growth and investment options for poverty reduction in Nigeria. Xinshen Diao, Manson Nwafor, Vida 
Alpuerto, Kamiljon Akramov, and Sheu Salau, 2010. 
953.  Micro-level practices to adapt to climate change for African small-scale farmers: A review of selected literature. Till 
Below, Astrid Artner, Rosemarie Siebert, and Stefan Sieber, 2010. 
952.  Internal migration and rural service provision in Northern Ghana. Fleur Wouterse, 2010. 
951.  Implications of avian flu for economic development in Kenya. James Thurlow, 2010. 
950.  Is SAFTA trade creating or trade diverting? A computable general equilibrium assessment with a focus on Sri Lanka. 
Antoine Bouët, Simon Mevel, and Marcelle Thomas, 2010. 
949.  Who should be interviewed in surveys of household income? Monica Fisher, Jeffrey J. Reimer, and Edward R. Carr, 2010. 
948.  Breaking the norm: An empirical investigation into the unraveling of good behavior. Ruth Vargas Hill, Eduardo 
Maruyama, and Angelino Viceisza, 2010.  
947.  Agricultural growth, poverty, and nutrition in Tanzania. Karl Pauw and James Thurlow, 2010. 
946.  Labeling genetically modified food in India: Economic consequences in four marketing channels. Sangeeta Bansal and 
Guillaume Gruère, 2010. 
945.  Toward a typology of food security in developing countries. Bingxin Yu, Liangzhi You, and Shenggen Fan, 2010. 
944.  Paving the way for development? The impact of transport infrastructure on agricultural production and poverty 
reduction in the Democratic Republic of Congo. John Ulimwengu, Jose Funes, Derek Headey, and Liangzhi You, 2009. 
943.  Formal–informal economy linkages and unemployment in South Africa. Rob Davies and James Thurlow, 2009. 
942.  Recent food prices movements: A time series analysis. Bryce Cooke and Miguel Robles, 2009. 
941.  Decentralization, agricultural services and determinants of input use in Nigeria. Kamiljon T. Akramov, 2009. 
940.  How important are peer effects in group lending?  Estimating a static game of incomplete information.  Shanjun Li, 
Yanyan Liu, and Klaus Deininger, 2009. 
939.  Rice production responses in Cambodia. Bingxin Yu and Shenggen Fan, 2009. 
938.  A latent class approach to investigating consumer demand for genetically modified staple food in a developing country: 
The case of gm bananas in Uganda. Enoch Kikulwe, Ekin Birol, Justus Wesseler, and José Falck-Zepeda, 2009.  
937.  Cluster-based industrialization in China: Financing and performance. Cheryl Long and Xiaobo Zhang, 2009.  




2033 K Street, NW 




IFPRI ADDIS ABABA 
P. O. Box 5689 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Tel.: +251 11 6463215 
Fax: +251 11 6462927 
Email: ifpri-addisababa@cgiar.org 
IFPRI NEW DELHI 
CG Block, NASC Complex, PUSA 
New Delhi 110-012 India 
Tel.: 91 11 2584-6565 
Fax: 91 11 2584-8008 / 2584-6572 
Email: ifpri-newdelhi@cgiar.org 